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Although the Declaration of Independence was written within a juris-
prudence of natural law and natural rights, consistent with the classical
and Christian tradition, the fundamental law - the Constitution - was
born within a Hobbesian view of human nature and vested interests. This
has resulted in difficulty when discussing law and ethics in an American
context. In fact, the American constitutional tradition has not been influ-
enced strongly by either the classical Republican tradition, where virtue
was the objective of government and was to be brought about by stern
laws, or by the Christian tradition, in which the essence of government
was the inculcation of virtue through respect for the natural rights of the
person, the Church, school, and family. American constitutionalism, how-
ever, attempted to preserve the best of both classical and Christian
traditions.
This article will describe how, through the balancing of the influence
of contending groups, the American constitutional tradition became a
guarantor of economic freedom. The constitutional rationale was predi-
cated on a value system which fostered economic privatism and struggle,
while denigrating moral purposes and the political philosophy of human
rights. The inculcation of virtue, it was hoped, would be left to the
churches, schools, and families. The American tradition thus sought a
middle road between the classical Christian traditions and extreme
Hobbesianism. This framework proved successful in an explosively ex-
panding economy. In our era of economic contraction, however, the tradi-
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tional interest-analysis as the basis for law-legal realism-is no longer
efficacious.
These problems were inherent in the Constitution itself and were
first observed by the 19th century abolitionists who discerned that the
Constitution was predicated on procedural due process for property
rights, rather than human rights. The concern with protecting property
rights, for example, supported the institution of slavery. The Civil War
was not fought over the issue of slavery, but over the issue of Union; the
North remained willing to incorporate the institution of slavery into the
Constitution itself.' This attitude is clearly demonstrated by the ap-
proach of the American judiciary toward this problem from 1810 through
1861.
Objective judicial decisionmaking was the product of the legal devel-
opment in the United States which attempted to deal with the pro-
foundly human, moral, and agonizing problem of American slavery.2 It is
ironic that modern American judicial decisionmaking had its origins and
principal development in the defense of this inhuman American
phenomenon.
From the beginning, American jurists accepted the moral teaching of
Blackstone that slavery was contrary to natural law.3 The American judi-
ciary of the 18th and 19th centuries adhered to this view, almost without
exception.4 Its constitutional analyses, however, led it to uphold slavery
As heirs of moderate constitutional antislavery, the Republicans preserved a strong at-
tachment to the consensus of the country which was, overall, willing to accept almost any
compromise with slavery as a local state rule. The original thirteenth amendment, endorsed
by almost all leading Republicans and actually sent out by Congress to the states for ratifi-
cation, provided
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic insti-
tutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said
State.
Joint Resolution of March 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 251. In his first inaugural address, Abraham
Lincoln claimed that this point was already "implied constitutional law," but that it would
do no harm to put the federal consensus explicitly into the Constitution. First Inaugural
Address, in IV THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 270 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
See generally R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, notes:
[Plure and proper slavery does not, [nor] cannot, subsist in England; such I mean,
whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and
fortune of the slave. And, indeed, it is repugnant to reason, and the principles of
natural law, that such a state should subsist anywhere.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 423 (W. Jones ed. 1915).
1 One of America's foremost jurists, Joseph Story, often used his charges to juries to speak
out against the immorality of slavery and the slave trade. He claimed that the only policy
consistent with "the spirit of the Constitution, the principles of our free government, the
tenor of the Declaration of Independence and the dictates of humanity and sound policy"
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as an institution in every major case of the period.5 The dichotomy be-
tween natural and fundamental law is nowhere more evident and leads to
an unavoidable question: How did an entire legal system uphold an insti-
tution as contemptible as slavery, which all major jurists of the period
recognized as conflicting with the higher law, natural justice, and the ba-
sic principles of government?e
The fundamental tension between some form of higher law and
human positive law presented a dilemma. This problem was not new to
the- 19th century.7 Moral arguments, of course, are not, and cannot, be
resolved legally or politically; they remain with and are dependent on the
moral sense of a people. Only by understanding this fundamental dichot-
omy between ethics and legality, in the context of slavery, can we begin to
understand .the fundamental conflict and contradiction in the American
legal and political system. The moral cleavage in American society, which
became evident as a result of the conflicting moral attitudes toward the
institution of slavery, grew so large that it eliminated "the areas where
the judge could move the law in the direction of freedom."8 Ultimately,
the judiciary chose to enforce the Fugitive Slave Laws, not because they
were moral'-the judges were not concerned with morality in applying
the law-but because enforcement was necessary to save the Union. 0 The
was for Congress to abolish slavery in the territories. See Salem Gazette, Dec. 10, 1819, at 3,
col. 1.
8 See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). It has been suggested that
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, was "sufficiently different from the Act of 1793,
[1 Stat. 302] which it amended." R. COVER, supra note 2, at 175. It is interesting to note,
however, that Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion in Booth, upholding the constitution-
ality of the Act, is supported exclusively by authority relating to the earlier Act. Id. at 187.
See generally G. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1968).
* See R. COVER, supra note 2, at 175-91. Cover's argument concerns the way jurists dealt
with the problem, whereas the focus of the present article is to trace the resolution of the
conflict between "natural law" and "positive law."
7 See Riga, Marsiglio of Padova: Father and Creator of the Modern Legal System, 29 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1421, 1425-45 (1978).
R. COVER, supra note 2, at 7.
* See Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Ca. 322 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850), wherein Justice McLean charged
the jury: "These laws [Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850] lie at the foundation of the
social compact, and their observance is essential to the maintenance of civilization. In these
matters, the law, and not conscience, constitutes the rule of action." Id. at 326.
o Chief Justice Tilghman of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was at the origin of the
historical-necessity thesis:
Whatever may be our private opinions on the subject of slavery, it is well known that
our southern brethren would not have consented to become parties to a constitution
under which the United States have enjoyed so much prosperity, unless their prop-
erty in slaves had been secured.
Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawl. 62, 62-63 (Pa. 1819). See also II J. HURD, THE LAW OF
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moral dichotomy was underscored by the decision in Scott v. Sandford,"
prior to which it was possible to pretend that, although slavery was a
reality in certain parts of the Union, the fundamental law was not pro-
slavery. After Dred Scott, the pretense was no longer possible, and the
heart of judicial formalism was dead.
The abolitionist view,1' that a radical dichotomy existed between
natural and positive law, that the entire Constitution was a proslavery
document, and that it was in fine a compact with the devil, seemed more
acceptable after the Dred Scott decision. The abolitionists recognized
that in the face of a conflict between natural and positive law, the judici-
ary was obliged to faithfully execute the positive law. The predominant
jurists of the slave period, Justices Story, Curtis, Shaw, Taney, and Mar-
shall, acknowledged that the Constitution embodied a compromise on the
issue of slavery. As a result, servitude was perpetuated for millions. 8 The
jurists hoped, however, that the slavery system would itself wither and
die of its own moral weakness. It did not.
The abolitionist Wendell Phillips, like the jurists, viewed the Consti-
tution as protecting slavery. He pointed to five parts of the Constitution
as irrefutably demonstrating this proposition: the three-fifths clause," the
prohibition on Congress to forbid the slave trade until 1808,15 the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause," the clause affording Congress the power to suppress
FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 439 (1968).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
See generally W. PHILLIPS, THE CONSTrrUTION: A PRo-SLwvmY COMPACT (1844), wherein
the author compiles all of the then available data on the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution with respect to slavery. It is ironic to note that Chief Justice Taney used much
of the material contained therein to buttress his opinion in Dred Scott. Phillips went fur-
ther the following year. See W. PHI.LIPS, CAN ABOLITIONISTS VOTE OR TAKE OFFICE UNDER
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION? (1845). In this latter work he deals with the complicity
of abolitionists in a system which is basically corrupt and corrupting. Still one year later,
Phillips destroyed the arguments of Spooner who tried to show that slavery was contrary to
the Constitution itself. See W. PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSTANDER SPOONER'S UNCONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1847). Phillips also called for the resignation of antislavery judges.
Yet, there is not one judge on record who ever did resign. In any event, Dred Scott showed
whatever judges remained to be convinced, that Phillips was correct and that the moral
question could no longer be avoided. The ameliorist judges simply had nowhere else to turn
except to resignation or revolution. The legal system could no longer salvage their
consciences.
" It is remarkable that throughout the majority opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Dred
Scott, he never once refers to slaves as human beings, but only as beings. Thus, Taney
considered slaves "a subordinate and inferior class of beings," 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05, a
"subject race," id. at 417, "free persons of color," id. at 421, and "property of the master in
a slave," id. at 451.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
lo U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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insurrection,17 and the provision for federal assistance in suppressing do-
mestic violence. 16 Both abolitionists and judges agreed that the Constitu-
tion, as the product of a bargain, was the price paid for the Union.1' Since
the judge was not permitted to apply his own moral vision of natural
right or wrong with respect to slavery, however, the post Dred Scott anti-
slavery judge could not escape into an ameliorist position. To do other-
wise would violate his "paramount obligation" as a member of the
judiciary.
Slavery is an important example, since it clearly demonstrates the
failure of legal realism and of objective, rational rulemaking. When con-
fronted with a profound moral issue, due to intolerable moral pressure,
judges become technicians of the law. Both natural law and the historical
analysis of the common law, which had outlawed slavery, were rejected to
preserve the Union. Thus, law became a system of technical norms, ap-
plied because judges "had no choice"-they could only enforce the law,
not make it. The conscience of the judiciary was therefore subordinated
to technical procedures, in order to prevent dissolution of the Union and
rampant disorder. The concepts of order and unity were substituted for
justice, and a judicial procedural efficiency developed to meet the crisis of
slavery. Law now insured order, rather than justice. In our constitutional
system, this result was unavoidable.
The Constitution could not deal with the moral problem of slavery,
since it was not designed to do so. It was created to protect property,
human or otherwise. If the moral problem of slavery was to be resolved,
war or national division was inevitable. It could not have been resolved
politically because the Constitution, as Dred Scott demonstrated, was an
amoral document fashioned to protect property through due process. The
Constitution is not and has never incorporated any public philosophy, un-
less philosophy connotes only the basic right to earn, keep, exchange, and
inherit property. The slavery issue was not an aberration from the spirit
of the American Constitution-it was its logical, ideological development.
II.
In addition to this constitutional moral void, the breakdown of tradi-
tional value sources-family, school, and church-has resulted in a
profound crisis of meaning and purpose at the heart of America's self-
understanding. The traditional moral purposelessness of American gov-
ernment, perhaps a strength in an expanding economy, has now run its
course, since we have reached the end of an era of abundance and wealth.
'7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
IS U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
10 See W. PHILLIPs, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT vi-viii (1844).
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Today, we face an era of scarcity and simplicity. Questions of purpose
and meaning have become ever more urgent as the traditional constitu-
tional response becomes ever more meaningless.
At stake in any political system is the human meaning of a society
within history. Traditional economic privatism and conflicting interest re-
lationships, predicated on moral purposelessness, can offer no relief in
this crisis since they are a part of the problem.
Jurisprudence now concerns itself with procedure, rather than the
traditional concepts of good, evil, and justice. This procedural freedom
thus emphasizes individualized, atomistic freedoms, 0 with little concern
for social responsibility and restraint-concepts at the heart of a humane
and civilized society. Where are the American people to find the meaning
and significance of their society and of themselves within the American
system if not from the political order, the laws, the schools, the Churches,
or the family?
Self-understanding is the necessary condition of a sense of self-iden-
tity and self-confidence, whether in the case of a nation or an individual.
It is imperative that the American people somehow find an affirmation
that they are a people unique in history. The complete loss of one's iden-
tity is hell; in diminished forms it is insanity. It would not bode well for
the American giant to go lumbering about the world, lost and mad.
Any self-understanding which presently exists in the people is a last-
ing asset from past ecclesial, familial, and educational efforts, and from a
tradition of the common law, which itself was born of the Christian expe-
rience. As these institutions continue to fail as sources of value, what is to
take their place? Perhaps a shock is in store for the researcher or political
scientist as he examines the American system; nothing of moral purpose
or of public philosophy may be found. The American system has no sub-
stance of political faith. While the Founding Fathers hoped the people
would have faith in the system they devised for the training of unruly
human nature, they relied on other social institutions to supply the values
necessary for this democratic-republican system to function. Despite their
stunning foresight, they simply never dreamed that those institu-
tions-church, school, and family-would fail.
III.
Traditional republicanism viewed society as held together by a com-
mon moral fiber. This outlook was strongly reinforced by the law, which
served to instill virtue in the people. In the classical tradition, material-
ism was inimical to the public interest. The laws, despite their draconian
nature, were designed to vigorously reinforce civic virtue in the public
20 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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interest.
America was originally faced with a novel situation. Its people com-
prised a heterogeneous group in one single nation; its breadth went far
beyond the small, homogeneous city-states of ancient Greece and Rome
which gave birth to the republicanism of the classical vintage. How were
the Founding Fathers to bring together such a diverse people into one
national entity and purpose? The constitutional solution was to provide-
the nation with no moral purpose at its core. Rather, a national purpose-
lessness, controlled by the economic checks and balances of private self-
interests, was supplied. The constitutionally created institutions of
America were federalism, the representative system, presidential govern-
ment, the adversary system, economic security, and the national de-
fense.2' The central government would have all powers "necessary and
proper" to bring this about, and private-economic individualism was
guaranteed by the federal government.
A frenetic economic development could be carried on with a studied
obliviousness to public purposes and individual virtue. In a sense, the
American system presupposed such virtue, and hoped that it would con-
tinue to emanate from the social sectors discussed above. Thus, there has
been no American purpose, ideology, or national philosophy. This may be
viewed as both a remedy for a vastly differing ideological population, and
as a positive good in channeling the natural greed of men towards a har-
monious national direction. Traditional ambition and upward mobility
were thereby nurtured as the American way. It is futile, therefore, to look
to traditional American political and legal institutions for a national pur-
pose. To this is added an almost total disintegration of other sources of
values-the school and the family. As a result, the future of our institu-
tions is, at best, bleak.
This situation demands a solution; the easiest solution will be one
imposed-in some form of authoritarianism. This will, however, necessitate
the end of our free society. Although Americans have learned the risks of
material ambition, and that such ambition cannot guarantee happiness,
wealth and luxury are nonetheless desirable social objects. Today, this is
a sort of death wish. We live amidst the bankruptcy of materialism and'
economic individualism-the pathologies of our modernity. This has cre-
ated the need for public purposes and a public spirit never before ob-
served on the American scene. Genuine freedom, in both the individual
and national sense, simply cannot exist without values, meaning, and
public purpose.




For the classical republican tradition, human association reached its
perfection in the polis. To participate in political life was the greatest
privilege accorded man. The object of the law was not simply justice, but
the production of the virtuous citizen who could participate in the life of
the polis as citizen. The polis itself was a partnership for the formation of
character. In that partnership, the character of citizens was formed in
accordance with a shared view of basic moral values-the shared views of
the beautiful, the useful, and the just. The function of the law, to incul-
cate and reinforce the commonly shared values of the polis, was demand-
ing and stern since it was clear that virtue was not readily acquired. The
enemies of virtue were ease, sloth, wealth, creature comfort, and sexual
license. In the virtuous polis, it was necessary for these vices to be se-
verely restrained by the law.
This classical republicanism was rejected by the Founding Fathers.
They, like Aristotle, saw the difficulty in training human nature in virtue,
but rejected the use of the force of law to achieve virtue. Rather, they
accepted the Hobbesian view that human nature was, at least to an ex-
tent, corrupt and had to be restrained not by legal force, but by the con-
tentious interests of greedy human nature itself. They dealt realistically
with this aspect of man's nature by balancing powerful human passions
and interests. Government-as distinguished from the total societas of
the classical tradition-would limit its role to mediating and procedurally
safeguarding this process within certain tolerable limits. Since the classi-
cal tradition was monist in its commonly held values, there was no sepa-
ration of state and government, society and government, or church and
state. All were one, and the emperor retained all power.
The new American concept of government would depoliticize govern-
ment; religion was now relegated to private practice and concern. Educa-
tion, family mores, and economics were no longer functions of a govern-
ment limited to the protection of individual life, liberty, property, and
the private pursuit of happiness. All other institutions of the societas
were free to establish their own norms and objectives, since government
had nothing to do with character formation or values. Thus, government
was disassociated from the process of the instillment of virtue. The busi-
ness of the government was business. In a political sense, what was good
for General Motors would be good for the country: "The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary
and ordinary operations of Government. s2 The American way would be
rooted in economic self-interest; one group would be kept in check in a
THE FEDERALIST, No. 10 (J. Madison) at 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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balancing process by another group with different interests, through laws
and government. All. parties would develop a commodious symbiosis in
order to avoid destructive zealotry.
It is dangerous for a free society to attempt to train citizens in the
ways of virtue through draconian laws, as the ancients attempted, because
this entails the destruction of a great degree of freedom. Instead, the con-
stitutional system of conflicting interests was devised. Thus, in order to
avoid the destructive ideological and religious fratricides of the past,
America's policy deliberately risked magnifying and multiplying in Amer-
ican life the selfish, the interested, the narrow, and the crassly economic.
The Hobbesian war of all against all was attenuated, at least to the extent
that it was recognized. Further, the war would be conducted pursuant to
procedural rules which would guarantee a certain degree of fairness and
equality among the contending participants. The inherent self-interest
and greed of men would be controlled by the adversarial process. The
Founding Fathers checked vice with vice.
The classical tradition and the Founding Fathers shared a common
view that human nature, in need of restraint in organized society, is
changing. The ancients sought to fashion a unanimity of values and a
religion which could be enforced by stern laws. The Founding Fathers,
however, attempted a depoliticization of government, and a moderating
system of procedural safeguards under law. Character formation was left
to the private sector.
The balancing of interest with interest, and faction with faction, en-
joyed success in the economic and social climate of the past. In this era of
economic constraints, where cooperation is needed more than competi-
tion, the system of the past is no longer viable. The closest things we have
to shared values, a national sense of sport and the common materialistic
culture of the television medium, are hardly the moral virtues needed to
make a people distinctly unique. Some have suggested that the present
economic and social system can continue to function effectively by modi-
fying the more aggressive aspects of traditional American political wis-
dom. The acquisitive man should cultivate the virtues of venturesome-
ness, industriousness, and the suppression of immediate passions.23 This
will point man toward justice.24
The doctrine of self-interest properly understood does not inspire great sac-
rifices, but every day it prompts some small ones; by itself it cannot make a
man virtuous, but its discipline shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moder-
ate, careful, and self-controlled citizens. If it does not lead the will directly
23 Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIc 64 (R. Horwitz ed. 1977).
"' Id. at 65.
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to virtue, it establishes habits which unconsciously turn it that way.25
These virtues cannot be imposed by laws and decrees of governmental
authority. In fact, laws work in quite the opposite fashion, and the gov-
ernment has authority - legitimacy - when the people obey because
they are already virtuous, and understand that the laws are just. In this
respect, the removal of government by the Founding Fathers from the
business of directly superintending the formation of character was correct
from a jurisprudential point of view.
The Founders presupposed that other institutions would continue to
produce a virtuous citizen, standing ready to sacrifice for the common
good and to give of himself to the polis. This is precisely the problem
today. We suffer an utter bankruptcy of communal values and virtue. We
have traditionally opted for freedom and the formation of character
through avenues other than law. A problem arises when the whole society
has few institutions on which to rely for this most important duty of
character formation.
Today, the materialism produced by the American system is incapa-
ble of providing anything more than the empty purposelessness of the
"American Way." Our system should not be condemned for what it does
not and was never intended to produce-the virtuous citizen. The Foun-
ders created a constitutional system to free men from fiscal uncertainty,
irregularities in currency, trade wars among states, economic discrimina-
tion by more powerful foreign governments, attacks on property, and
popular insurrection. Such a system is not an aid in our present political
and legal quandary. The aim of the Founders was to create a government
that would act as an honest broker among a variety of propertied inter-
ests, thus affording those interests protection from common enemies
through the procedural process, and preventing them from becoming too
powerful.
V.
If the political system is irretrievably deteriorating, there will remain
no institution to restrain human passion when the traditional imparters
of virtue have ceased to exist or have been mortally weakened. Laws look
to the moral health of the citizens for their force and legitimacy, not vice
versa. Today, as more of our problems are resolved by courts, questions
are presented which the judiciary cannot and should not decide. The Su-
preme Court has passed on a myriad of social and moral questions in the
past twenty years that would have shocked the Founders of the Republic,
as well as previous courts. The law is now a means to accomplish moral
25 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 499 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1962).
26 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1980
ends which the classical tradition would have found astounding. This use
of the law is, in the final analysis futile and counterproductive. When
courts are used as shortcuts to moral ends, the short-term results may
appear excellent, but the system is eventually overloaded and finally de-
stroyed. Bitter fruits of court-imposed segregation cases and family abor-
tion cases are already apparent. The court system and its self-imposed
social and political value system is a short-term narcotic which tempora-
rily alleviates some of the pain, but cannot cure the fatal disease. The
disease is individual political and social purposelessness and despair,
which no court can remedy or cure. Our present political institutions sim-
ply were not designed to provide a source of purpose and value; their
object was to provide a framework of moral neutrality and legal
proceduralism, thereby holding human passions and differing ideologies
in check by means of controlled-interest balancing and competition. Is
there any solution to this massive anomaly? There is no known civiliza-
tion which has followed our path and returned to a renewed moral and
intellectual, political vigor. Given its view of human nature and its basis
of freedom, the American experiment was doomed from the outset. The
moral deterioration has arrived, and the authoritarian solution which we
have avoided for over two centuries must be invoked to establish some
form of order.
In a sense, we have already moved into that imposed phase of civil
life where many of the important questions affecting the citizen are not
made by him, but by unelected and unresponsive courts of law. There
seems to be no other force which Americans will communally accept or
obey, precisely because they share no communal sense of purpose. To-
day's courts, in the guise of applying the law, are the origins of the au-
thoritatively imposed solution to our present problem. There is no phase
of our social life which has not been intimately touched and legislated
upon by the courts which alone seem to have a commonly recognized au-
thority in every aspect of human existence. By definition, this is authori-
tarianism. The courts, as part of the American tripartite form of govern-
ment, have now invaded the sphere of the societas previously forbidden
to the government under the American system. We are, therefore, retreat-
ing to the classical tradition as it regressed from republicanism to
authoritarianism.
This is not, of course, the enterprise of evil men, but the result of a
lack of common virtues and goals. The judiciary has become the arbiter of
moral, social, and political values. It alone has had the authority to im-
pose a solution where none has been forthcoming from any other political
or social institution. This explains why the judicial system can be so de-
spised by the American people, yet so heavily utilized by the citizenry.
Since Americans cannot agree on the moral values underlying these
problems, they permit the courts to resolve issues for them. What used to
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be a practical solution to a difficult application of law has now become
the arbiter of moral values. Legalism is now raised to the level of a moral
imperative in the minds of many Americans. Ironically, we have come to
expect the same solution which pre-Civil War Americans expected from
the United States Supreme Court. They left the solution of their basic
and divisive moral problems to the Court for a determination, and were
given the Dred Scott decision.
